Liam R.
United Kingdom · Freelance Penetration Tester · Self-Employed
University of Glasgow
167 followers
About
Senior Penetration Tester and Principal Security Consultant with over 30 years of experience in offensive security, including a long tenure as a CESG CHECK Team Leader. Specialist in infrastructure, web application, cloud, and OT security assessments for UK Government, MOD, and global commercial sectors. Expert in manual testing excellence, custom security tool development, and technical leadership.
Specialties
- AI / ML Security
- Cloud Security
- Kubernetes Security
- Penetration Testing
- Web Application Testing
Skills
- Web Application Penetration Testing
- Infrastructure Penetration Testing
- Cloud Security (AWS, Azure, M365)
- OT / ICS / CNI Assessments
- OSINT
- Python
- PHP
- Bash
- Ansible
- C#
75 skills in total
Experience
-
Freelance Penetration Tester
Self-Employed
Jan 2024 — Present
Remote / UK
-
Senior Security Consultant
Resillion (formerly Commissum)
Jan 2023 — Jan 2024
-
Principal Security Consultant
Pentura Ltd / Intelisecure EMEA / Rootshell Security Ltd
Jan 2015 — Jan 2023
26 experiences in total
Education
-
University of Glasgow
BACHELOR
Oct 1995 — Oct 1996
-
University of Aberdeen
MASTER
Oct 1990 — May 1994
Recent posts
Many of us have experimented with agentic agents and realised pretty quickly that you often need a human in the loop.. AND that human needs to know what they are doing!
#microsoft #outlook #agentic #60000sacked
lmao
I've released **MaSSHole**, a free, detection-only, checker for ***sshole (CVE-2026-123158)**, the OpenSSH password-authentication bypass on musl-based Linux such as Alpine.
Quick recap of the flaw: on musl systems where sshd runs without PAM and password authentication is enabled, an oversized password is accepted for accounts that have no password (shadow field "*"). That's the default openssh-server setup on Alpine, and Alpine's cloud images ship a key-only "alpine" user with passwordless doas. It's fixed in OpenSSH 10.6p2 and in Alpine's backported packages.
The awkward part: Alpine's fixes keep the old version string, so a patched host and a vulnerable one look identical from the network, and many scanners can't tell them apart. MaSSHole is built for that.
🔎 **For penetration testers (on authorised engagements)**
• Sweep ranges, CIDRs or host lists without credentials to find candidate hosts
• Rule out glibc distros, Dropbear, password-auth-off and patched upstream builds
• Confirm candidates with credentialed checks, with CSV output for reporting
🛠️ ** For DevOps, SRE and platform teams**
• Check VMs, cloud instances and containers that run sshd: musl, PAM, patch level per Alpine branch, effective sshd config (including Match blocks) and exposed accounts
• Run it locally, or across a fleet over SSH with sudo/doas
• Exit codes make it easy to drop into CI or configuration-management checks
🛡️ **For blue teams**
• Searches auth logs for password logins to password-less accounts, the main indicator of compromise
It never sends a password and never attempts the bypass. It's a single POSIX shell script that runs on Alpine's BusyBox shell, with a Docker lab (vulnerable, patched, mitigated, PAM, glibc and "compromised" hosts) so you can verify its results before pointing it at anything real.
👉 https://github.com/liamromanis101/MaSSHole
Use it only on systems you own or are authorised to test. If it finds a vulnerable host: upgrade openssh (or set PasswordAuthentication no right away), and treat any host with log hits as compromised.
Feedback and pull requests welcome.
#CyberSecurity #OpenSSH #AlpineLinux #PenetrationTesting #DevSecOps #VulnerabilityManagement #InfoSec #DevOps #SRE #Musl #libc #cve-2026-123158
**Fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) is being actively exploited. Is your Linux estate exposed?**
CISA added Fragnesia to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 28 October. This Linux kernel flaw lets a low-privileged local user write to the page cache of read-only files and gain root.
It can’t be exploited remotely on its own, but attackers are now chaining it with **PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619)**. Dream Security reports that this took them from unauthenticated remote code execution to root on 25 devices.
K8s-container_escape_audit has covered Fragnesia for some time. It’s built to find container escapes, but it can be used on any Linux system to check:
* Kernel version: a distro-aware CVE verdict that says when a version string can’t prove a backported fix
* Loaded modules: whether the affected ESP modules are actually loaded
* Blacklisting: whether those modules are blocked in /etc/modprobe.d
* Live patching: whether an agent could make uname -r misleading
Here’s an example from a system with the modules blocked:
*[WARN] CVE-2026-46300 (Fragnesia ESP): kernel patch status defer (not confirmed fixed) — verify
. Version verdict: ubuntu: consult ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-46300 — backport status not derivable from version string
+ Module loaded (/proc/modules): none of [esp4 esp6] present in /proc/modules
+ Module blacklist (/etc/modprobe.d): all of [esp4 esp6] blacklisted via 'install ... /bin/false'
[MEDIUM ] Fragnesia ESP (CVE-2026-46300) — MEDIUM [ITW] [CISA-KEV]*
The modules are blocked, but the kernel fix still isn’t confirmed, so the tool asks you to verify it rather than reporting a pass.
Run it on the host to check blacklisting, because inside a container it reads the image’s configuration, not the host’s. On a host, focus on the CVE and kernel results, as some container checks won’t apply.
Our recommendations
* Install your distro’s fixed kernel and reboot, then confirm the running kernel is the fixed version.
* Treat an inconclusive result as unpatched until your vendor’s tracker confirms the fix.
* If you can’t patch yet, block and unload esp4 and esp6. This breaks IPsec, so check VPN use first.
* Patch PHP and any appliances that embed it, as PHP2Shell is the current route in. Older branches may need a vendor fix.
* Check exposed systems for webshells. Fragnesia alters the page cache rather than the file on disk, so integrity tools may miss it.
The tool is free for personal use. Download an SLSA verified release here: https://github.com/liamromanis101/K8s-container_escape_audit and then update the cve_checks.conf database.
cve_checks.conf update — PwnEscape (CVE-2026-99999) added
The CVE database now tracks PwnEscape, a critical (CVSS 9.3) flaw in the Linux host kernel’s IPv4 output path — not in KVM itself. A malicious virtio_net_hdr from a guest (bad csum_start/csum_offset) is honoured by skb_checksum_help()/ip_do_fragment(), letting the host write a checksum out of bounds, rewrite the IPv4 header, and disclose/overwrite kernel heap. It’s primarily a KVM/Firecracker guest→host escape, but is tracked here for its documented (unreproduced) local container path via an unprivileged user namespace + tun/AF_PACKET — flagged for shared CI runners using rootless containers.
An ~18-year-old bug (introduced 2.6.27, 2008), fixed mid-October 2026 via commit 6785011f8b16: mainline 7.3 and stable 5.10.272 / 5.15.223 / 6.1.190 / 6.6.159 / 6.12.113 / 6.18.57 / 7.2.11. Encoded as a kernel_version check with full version data, so vanilla kernels get a definitive verdict and distro kernels defer to the vendor tracker.
Conf-only change; CVE database 55 → 56 entries. Read-only, no script change.
Note: the CVE-2026-99999 identifier is what’s in universal public circulation but looks like a placeholder — the entry carries a [VERIFY CVE ID] flag pending a possible canonical reassignment.
container_escape_audit.sh v4.8.4 — built for the kernels Kubernetes actually runs on
An update to the read-only container-escape and LPE auditor, focused on the Linux distributions you actually find under Kubernetes nodes, plus two fresh CVEs.
Node-OS coverage. The CVE engine now derives a vendor alias from /etc/os-release’s ID_LIKE, so CloudLinux, Rocky, AlmaLinux and Oracle Linux resolve to the right vendor tracker instead of returning an unhelpful “unknown”. On a CloudLinux node, the recent container escapes, ncluding the actively-exploited CVE-2026-80521 now correctly defer to the vendor advisory rather than going dark.
Kernel live-patching awareness (new check 62). KernelCare, Canonical Livepatch, kpatch and Ksplice all patch CVEs without changing uname -r, the blind spot in every version-based scanner. Check 62 detects the agent, reads the effective patch level, and flags every version-based verdict as “confirm via the live-patch tool, not uname.”
Two new CVEs:
CVE-2026-43501 “Route of Root”: IPv6 RPL segment-routing-header corruption; LPE and container escape via core_pattern. Successor to Route of Death. Public kernelCTF exploit.
CVE-2025-39964: AF_ALG concurrent-write race; container escape to host root in kernelCTF. Distinct from Copy Fail despite the shared subsystem. CVSS scored honestly (disputed 5.5–7.8; encoded at Red Hat’s 7.3).
Read-only throughout.
github.com/liamromanis101/K8s-container_escape_audit
#ContainerSecurity #Kubernetes #LinuxSecurity #DevSecOps #CVE