Joshua C.
Bossier City, Louisiana · Director of Cybersecurity · Crescendo AI
Community College of the Air Force
26 followers
About
I’m a cybersecurity executive, professor, author, board advisor, and cyber reserve leader with 25+ years of experience across federal, state, and commercial environments.
My work sits at the intersection of cybersecurity, business risk, AI governance, cloud security, resilience, and executive decision-making.
I help organizations move past security theater and build programs that actually survive contact with the real-world.
That means turning cybersecurity from a checklist into an operational capability. It means translating technical risk into business language. It means helping leaders understand what matters, what is noise, and what will actually break when pressure hits.
I have led and advised cybersecurity programs across enterprise security, SOC operations, GRC, risk management, infrastructure architecture, incident readiness, cloud security, and resilience strategy. I have worked both sides of the table as a buyer, practitioner, advisor, and vendor-side leader, which gives me a practical view of what security teams need, what executives hear, and what customers trust.
I currently serve as a cybersecurity executive, teach graduate cybersecurity courses, advise organizations and startups, write and speak on security leadership, and serve as Deputy Commander of the Louisiana State Guard Cyber Reserve.
My focus areas include:
• Cybersecurity strategy
• AI risk and governance
• Cloud and infrastructure security
• Security leadership and team development
• GRC and risk management
• Incident response and operational resilience
• Executive advisory and board-level communication
• Trust, customer assurance, and security as a business enabler
I am also the voice behind #UnpopularOpinion, where I challenge lazy assumptions, vanity metrics, compliance theater, and the comfortable myths that keep cybersecurity programs fragile.
Cybersecurity is not just about tools, frameworks, or audits.
It is about whether the organization can keep functioning when reality gets ugly.
I write, speak, teach, and advise on one core belief:
Security should make the business stronger, not slower.
Let’s connect if you are building a security program, scaling a team, preparing for AI-driven risk, strengthening resilience, or trying to make cybersecurity make sense outside the security department.
Previously held TS/SCI Clearance, Public Trust, and CJIS.
Disclaimer: Opinions and posts are my own and do not represent the views of my employer, clients, partners, vendors, or sponsors.
Specialties
- AI / ML Security
- CISO / Security Leadership
- Cybersecurity Consulting
- Security Operations Leadership
- Security Program Management
Skills
- SOC 2
- ISO 27001
- ISO 42001
- HIPAA
- AI Risk
- Cloud Security
- SaaS Security
- GRC Leadership
- Enterprise Risk Management
- Cyber Risk Quantification
20 skills in total
Experience
-
Director of Cybersecurity
Crescendo AI
Apr 2025 — Present
Remote/Global
-
Founder and Principal
UOG LLC
May 2024 — Present
Remote
-
Adjunct Professor of Cybersecurity
Tulane University
May 2023 — Present
Remote
8 experiences in total
Education
-
Community College of the Air Force
Associate of Applied Science, Logistics
Sep 1998 — Mar 2011
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Community College of the Air Force
Associate of Applied Science, Information Technology
Sep 1998 — Mar 2011
9 education entries in total
Recent posts
It’s Friday and it’s a from the inbox edition of #unpopularopinion: AI companies are paying professionals to teach machines how they do their jobs. Short-term boon. Potentially long-term bust.
Consider the economics.
A mid-level SOC analyst earning $98,000 annually makes roughly $47 an hour.
AI companies are offering $80–$150 an hour, plus bonuses, to record cybersecurity professionals investigating incidents, triaging vulnerabilities, and explaining their decisions.
And here’s the kicker: This can happen during their regular workday.
You’re already investigating the incident. Already reviewing the logs. Already solving the problem. Now someone wants to pay you to narrate it.
Potentially getting paid twice for the same work, assuming your employer permits it. Or even knows you are doing it….
That’s a hell of a side hustle.
But this isn’t limited to cybersecurity.
Lawyers explaining legal reasoning. Accountants analyzing financial records. Engineers documenting design decisions.
And the skilled trades? Electricians, plumbers, HVAC technicians, and mechanics demonstrating how they diagnose and solve problems.
They’re even buying existing videos.
That plumbing repair tutorial? The engine teardown? The electrical troubleshooting walkthrough? All potentially valuable AI training material.
Different industries. Same proposition.
Get paid today for expertise someone else may commercialize tomorrow.
And AI doesn’t have to replace an entire profession to change its economics.
If AI allows fewer people to perform the same workload, reduces billable hours, or makes specialized knowledge more accessible, the market value of that expertise can shift.
The SOC analyst collects $1,500 for ten hours of recordings. The AI company potentially commercializes that knowledge across thousands of customers.
The professional gets paid once. The AI company may monetize the resulting capability repeatedly.
I’m not criticizing anyone for taking the money. At three times your normal hourly rate, I understand the appeal.
But when that knowledge is captured during someone’s regular job, who owns it? The employee? The employer? The customer?
And what happens when the technology built from that expertise eventually puts downward pressure on the salary or service fees that made it valuable?
BL: The money is immediate. The consequences may not be…
#unpopularopinionguy
Happy Thursday! I have had a few people tell me about this and I gotta say, this is a new one from the #BDR folks.... #unpopularopinion: Worst cybersecurity sales tactic of the week? Disguising your sales pitch as a responsible vulnerability disclosure.
Seriously. Knock it off.
You send an email with an alarming subject line about a "critical security exposure" or "urgent vulnerability discovered in your environment." You make it sound like you've uncovered something that requires immediate attention from the security team.
Naturally, we investigate. Because that's what responsible security professionals do.
And then comes the punchline.
You haven't actually disclosed a vulnerability. You've run some automated reconnaissance, generated a scary-looking report, and conveniently need 30 minutes on my calendar to "walk me through the findings."
Congratulations. You've weaponized the responsible disclosure process to book a sales demo.
Here's the problem. Responsible disclosure is built on trust. Security researchers, ethical hackers, and defenders depend on that trust to communicate legitimate risks quickly and effectively.
When you abuse that process to generate leads, you're not just annoying a potential customer. You're creating noise in a communication channel where it can genuinely matter.
And the next time someone sends a legitimate warning? Your little marketing stunt has contributed to the skepticism that warning will face.
If you've genuinely discovered a vulnerability, provide the evidence, affected assets, potential impact, and enough technical detail for the organization to validate it. No demo required. No sales qualification. No mandatory discovery call.
If you want to sell me your product, sell me your product. I'm perfectly capable of evaluating a legitimate business proposition. If your product was actually that good...you wouldn't need a bait-and-switch sales tactic.
But don't pretend you're doing me a favor by protecting my organization when you're actually trying to hit your quarterly pipeline numbers.
BL: Responsible disclosure is not a lead-generation strategy. And fear is not a substitute for value. You didn't earn a meeting. You earned a place on my blocked-sender list.
#unpopularopinionguy
Criticality Live with me and my podcast partner Kayla Williams will be talking to the legendary Bob Carver at 11CT! Check it out on youtube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5XiSYBinsns
It is the middle of the week...and boy, it has been a month of a week... #unpopularopinion: CISA identified 100 companies critical to national security. The one that takes us down might be number 101.
Yesterday, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency revealed it had identified approximately 100 critical infrastructure companies for targeted cybersecurity engagement. The selection wasn't random. It combined national importance with five to six years of intelligence about what our adversaries are targeting.
Think about that. We have enough intelligence to identify where our enemies are positioning themselves, yet we're still having conversations about whether resilience deserves adequate funding.
Here's what bothers me.
A port can have world-class security and still be crippled when its power provider fails. A hospital can pass every compliance audit and still go dark when a telecommunications provider goes down. An entire supply chain can collapse because of a vendor nobody considered critical.
CISA recognizes these dependencies. But recognizing them and fixing them are two very different things.
I don't particularly care who made the list. Frankly, keeping the names confidential makes sense. Why telegraph to the whole world who ISN'T being fixed?
I care whether those organizations can actually operate through an attack. Whether they've tested recovery under realistic conditions. Whether their executives have funded resilience instead of just accepting risk on paper.
Because national security doesn't end at the boundary of a corporate network, and neither does accountability.
BL: We don't need 100 companies with prettier compliance dashboards. We need an entire ecosystem capable of taking a punch without collapsing. And that starts in the boardroom, not the SOC.
#unpopularopinionguy
It is the Monday-ist Tuesday in a long time....#unpopularopinion: America doesn't need a sophisticated foreign adversary to cripple critical services. Apparently, we're perfectly capable of doing it ourselves.
Look at the last five days.
Microsoft 365 goes down because of a software defect introduced months earlier.
The Federal Aviation Administration grounds flights nationwide after a routine L3Harris Technologies equipment upgrade appears to trigger cascading network failures.
JPMorganChase experiences a software bug that disrupts transactions involving other financial institutions.
Then United Airlines has its own technology meltdown, delaying departing flights.
And what's the recurring reassurance?
"It wasn't a cyberattack."
I'm sorry, but WHY IS THAT SUPPOSED TO MAKE ME FEEL BETTER?
We've built an entire cybersecurity industry around identifying threats, stopping attackers, and defending against sophisticated adversaries.
Meanwhile, routine maintenance, software changes, and ordinary technical failures are accomplishing disruptions that would make some ransomware operators jealous.
I'm not suggesting we stop worrying about adversaries. I'm suggesting we've become so obsessed with preventing someone ELSE from breaking our systems that we've normalized breaking them ourselves.
And when it happens, everyone wants to talk about whether it was malicious.
The person stranded at the airport doesn't care. Neither does the business owner who can't process payments or the hospital staff member who can't access critical communications.
Availability doesn't suddenly become less important because the outage was accidental.
Perhaps it's time to stop measuring cybersecurity maturity exclusively by how well we keep the bad guys out and start asking how effectively we keep our own operations running.
BL: Apparently, the biggest threat to availability in the last 7 days wasn't a hacker.
It was Tuesday's change request.
And Thursday's.
And Friday's.
And Monday's.
#unpopularopinionguy