Imrane T.
Brussels, Belgium · Offensive Security | Attack Chains & Business Logic · Detectify
29 followers
About
I focus on how authorization, identity and business logic break across API-driven systems.
Most of my work starts with a simple question: what happens when the backend trusts something it shouldn't?
I test authentication flows, object ownership, multi-tenant boundaries and API behavior, then look at how individual weaknesses can connect into larger attack paths.
Focused on SaaS, API-first systems and Web3 infrastructure.
Specialties
- Blockchain Security
- Ethical Hacking
- Penetration Testing
- Security Automation
- Web Application Testing
Skills
- Web/API Pentesting
- Attack Surface Mapping
- Recon Automation
- Vulnerability Chaining
- OSINT
- Infra Analysis
- Burp Suite
- DevTools
- Python
- PowerShell
41 skills in total
Experience
-
Security Researcher - Crowdsource
Detectify
Jul 2026 — Present
-
Offensive Security Researcher
SentryTrace
Feb 2025 — Present
Brussels, Belgium
Repositories
-
SentryTrace/attacksaga
Autonomous pentest agent that discovers, exploits and proves real impact in a controlled lab (OWASP Juice Shop)
Python · 3 stars
-
SentryTrace/sentry-tools
AI-assisted security workflow automation for authorized attack surface analysis, exposure validation, signal correlation, risk prioritization, and remediation reporting.
Python
-
SentryTrace/sentrytrace-research
External attack surface research and exposure analysis for SaaS and fintech infrastructures.
1 star
Recent posts
One authenticated session. One changed member ID. One missing ownership check.
While testing an API flow, I found that changing a client-controlled memberId allowed the session to resolve another account’s preference state.
Same session.
Different account object.
HTTP 200.
The returned data itself wasn’t highly sensitive. The interesting part was the authorization boundary behind it.
I broke down the validation process, root cause and remediation here:
https://medium.com/@insid_e/when-one-integer-crosses-the-authorization-boundary-60f782538213
#APISecurity #IDOR #Authorization #AppSec
**Found a GraphQL API where small issues chained into full cross-tenant compromise.**
Leaked workspace ID (client-side)
Unauth mutations (invite / waitlist)
No rate limit + batching abuse
IDOR on workspaceId (read + write)
**Impact: API keys, secrets, payments + full tenant takeover**
Write-up: https://medium.com/@insid_e/from-graphql-enumeration-to-cross-workspace-takeover-8e5a63edfcd0
**Started with a JS credential leak.**
Ended with:
cross-tenant payments + webhook interception.
Fintech APIs still break the same way:
auth is there, isolation isn’t.
Write-up (sanitized):
https://medium.com/@insid_e/how-i-chained-a-hardcoded-password-into-a-cross-merchant-payment-takeover-48294c608f03
**Built AttackSaga - an autonomous attack-chain agent for authorized lab environments.**
It doesn’t stop at finding bugs, it validates the full path to impact:
• authentication robustness
• access control weaknesses (IDOR)
• real data exposure proof
• structured report generation
End-to-end, from discovery → impact.
Localhost only. ScopeGuard enforced.
Repo: https://github.com/SentryTrace/attacksaga
**Blind SSRF → internal services → metadata exposure**
**Small input. Real infra risk.**