Christian T.
Birmingham · Fractional CISO | Strategic Cyber, Technology & AI Advisor | Founder, Alvearium Associates
University of Manchester
235 followers
About
Christian is a strategic CISO with twenty years of experience across financial services, legal, professional services, retail, and national critical infrastructure. He builds and leads security functions that withstand scrutiny and real adversaries, ensuring compliance and operational threat awareness. Christian is adept at navigating transformation, M&A, regulatory pressures, and live incident response, with a compliance footprint spanning the US, UK, EU, and Asia Pacific.
Skills
- NIST CSF 2.0
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022
- SOC 2
- CIS Controls v8.1
- Cyber Essentials Plus
- NIS2
- DORA
- PSD2
- PCI-DSS v4.0
- UK GDPR
33 skills in total
Experience
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Fractional Security Advisor
Alvearium Associates
Nov 2024 — Present
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Director, Cyber Professional Services
Pinsent Masons
May 2023 — Oct 2024
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Group CISO
Pinsent Masons LLP
Jun 2017 — May 2023
5 experiences in total
Education
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University of Manchester
Professional Certificate, Data & AI
Jan 2024
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University of Warwick
PG Cert, Cyber Security & Management
Jan 2016 — Jan 2023
3 education entries in total
Recent posts
Ask most organisations whether they have backups and the answer is a confident yes. Ask when they last restored one, and the room goes quiet, then someone mentions that the backup job sends a green email every night, which is treated as proof of something.
A backup you have never restored is a theory. The green email tells you a job finished, not that the data is usable, complete, or sitting somewhere the ransomware cannot reach when it goes looking, which it will.
Restore something real every quarter. Time it. Write down how long it took and whether the business could have survived that long without the system. Recovery objectives written in a policy have a habit of being far shorter than the ones measured with a stopwatch.
Your backups are fine, probably. When did you last check?
Supplier due diligence in most organisations is a 200 question form, sent to a vendor who answers it by pasting in the last 200 answers, and then filed as proof that third-party risk has been managed. Nobody mentions this.
Start instead by working out which five suppliers could genuinely stop you trading or leak your customers' data. Give those proper attention: contract terms, breach notification timings, an exit plan that exists outside the supplier's own portal. The other 195 can have a shorter form and a quieter life.
An ISO certificate tells you the supplier had a good audit day. It says nothing about whether they will ring you before the press does.
Which of your suppliers do you trust mainly because the logo looks familiar?
Most incident response plans I review are beautifully formatted and have never been opened by the people named in them. The contact list includes a CISO who left two years ago, a phone number that now reaches a pizza restaurant, and a recovery procedure that assumes the systems you need are still working.
A plan is not a capability. Capability is what happens at two in the morning when the author is on a beach and legal wants to know whether the regulator's clock has started.
Run a tabletop twice a year, make it slightly uncomfortable, and write down who decides what. Printing the plan also helps, since ransomware has a well documented dislike of paper.
When did your plan last meet a real decision?
Every organisation I speak to now has an AI strategy, and a surprising number have an AI policy. Far fewer can tell me which AI tools their staff are actually using on a Tuesday afternoon. The policy says approved tools only. The browser history says otherwise, and so does the marketing team's suspiciously polished prose.
Governance does not start with a framework, it starts with an inventory. Know what is in use, what data goes into it, and who is accountable when it goes wrong. Banning everything is the usual first instinct, and it works about as well as banning personal email did in 2009.
Give people a sanctioned option that is better than the unsanctioned one, and most of the shadow usage quietly retires.
Which AI tool did your policy forget to mention?
Board cyber reporting has a recurring genre: the traffic-light dashboard where everything is amber, nothing is urgent, and the same three risks have been amber since the last reorganisation. Amber is not a risk position. It is a way of avoiding a decision while appearing to have made one.
Useful board reporting answers three questions. What could hurt us most, what are we doing about it, and what do you need from us. If a slide cannot be tied to one of those, it is decoration, however well it has been aligned.
Fewer metrics, each with an owner and a date, will do more than a forty page pack ever has. I remain open to evidence otherwise, preferably in a single paragraph.