Schomer

Schomer

Decatur, IL · Principal Security Solutions Architect & Founder · Eternal boundaries

TryHackMe

34 followers

About

The ETBV Framework (Eternal Trust Boundary Validation)

The ETBV Framework is a deterministic, software-defined application security framework built to operate directly at the transport-to-application network boundary. It is engineered to be exceptionally lightweight with minimal processing overhead, allowing it to execute natively even on highly restricted host runtime interfaces—such as an unrooted Android user-space layer running inside a Termux container environment.

Core Architecture & Capabilities

• Inline Payload Mitigation: It acts as an inline protocol verification gate that intercepts network traffic streams in flight. By evaluating incoming data against hard invariant rules before an upstream socket connection can open, it deterministically drops unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) payload streams and isolates target applications from input-manipulation flaws.

• Telemetry Ingestion & Normalization: It utilizes streamlined Python streaming logic to ingest raw transaction logs dynamically, converting intercept events into fully compliant, multi-object STIX 2.1 threat intelligence bundles with absolute ID hygiene and synchronized microsecond temporal tracking.

• Architectural Flaw Isolation: It works alongside a targeted "ETBV Scanner" loop to track, verify, and block advanced, deep-layer architectural flaws (such as specific protocol vulnerabilities currently submitted under active CISA and MITRE coordination files) that standard automated static analysis tools routinely miss.

Specialties

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence
  • Cybersecurity Consulting
  • Embedded Security
  • Exploit Development
  • Security Architecture

Skills

  • Vulnerability Management
  • Patch Management
  • Risk Assessment
  • CIS Benchmarks
  • NIST Framework
  • ISO 27001
  • GRC
  • Exception & Deviation Tracking
  • Audit Evidence Collection
  • Layer Zero Security Architecture

30 skills in total

Licenses & Certifications

  • Jobberman Soft Skills Course (Self-Paced) Certificate

    Pending verification

    jobberman

    Issued Jun 2026

Experience

  • Eternal boundaries

    • Principal Security Solutions Architect & Founder

      Jul 2022 — Present

      Decatur, IL

    • founder & principal security architect

      Jan 2021 — Present

      decatur illinois

  • Cyber Security Specialist & Backend Lead

    Betha Groups / Collaborative Security Venturing

    Jan 2024 — Jan 2026

    Remote

4 experiences in total

Education

  • TryHackMe

    Advanced Cybersecurity Exploration & Practical Labs

    Jan 2021

  • AWS

    Cloud Practitioner Studies

    Jan 2021

3 education entries in total

Repositories

Recent posts

FBI FLASH Advisory (FLASH-20261113-001): Operational takeaways on ARTEX

Cutting through the noise on the ARTEX warning from Nov 13—here is what actually matters for defenders right now:

• What it is: A Go-based, multi-agent framework originally released on GitHub in July 2026 (since removed, forks still active) that wires LLMs (DeepSeek, Claude, GPT) into automated recon, exploitation, and privesc.

• The real bottleneck: Sub-3-hour progression from initial access to privileged control. Human-in-the-loop SOC triage doesn't survive that timeline.

• The ConnectWise/M365 reality check: Attackers didn't rely on novel zero-days—they used stolen backup credentials to spray 2,250+ downstream M365 tenants at up to 2,900 auth attempts/min (resulting in ~162 confirmed tenant breaches).

Immediate hunting/hardening checklist:

1. Audit Microsoft Entra service principals and OAuth app permissions (especially backup/RMM integrations).

2. Alert on high-velocity non-human sign-in bursts in Entra/Graph logs.

3. Enforce strict rate-limiting on external auth endpoints.

We're building ETBV specifically to close this automated-speed gap—curious how other blue teams here are tuning detections for high-velocity service principal abuse?

#threat-intel #ai-security #cloud

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📢 Shared from [group:3571db46-0dd0-4f20-ac48-7f104e1f333c:Cybersecurity Governance & Executive Accountability]

**THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE | #1**

**Your Risk Register Says "High." Who Decided That?**

A cybersecurity risk appears on the enterprise risk register.

Its rating is HIGH.

The CISO reviews it. The risk committee acknowledges it. The board receives it in a quarterly report.

Everyone agrees the risk deserves attention.

But here's the question nobody asks:

**Who determined that the risk was HIGH, and what evidence supports that conclusion?**

Was the rating based on a documented assessment of likelihood and business impact?

Was it inherited from a previous assessment?

Did someone apply a standard risk matrix without examining the organization's actual exposure?

Or has the rating remained unchanged for three years because nobody has challenged it?

A risk register is supposed to inform decisions, not merely catalog concerns.

**Here's today's governance challenge:**

Think about the highest-rated cybersecurity risk in your organization.

Could you explain to an executive exactly why it received that rating, what evidence supports it, and what would cause the rating to change?

**Or are we sometimes governing labels rather than risks?**

I'm interested in how practitioners validate and challenge risk ratings in the real world.

#CybersecurityGovernance #GRC #CyberRisk #RiskManagement #ExecutiveAccountability

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A November IETF draft says the same thing my framework is built on — and then it goes four steps further.

Sangam Kumar Das's draft on consequence-bound execution authority (draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority-00) puts it in one sentence: permission to propose an operation is not permission to cause its effect.

His architecture holds a proposed operation as a Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State until an independent validator checks its current authority — then a protected Finality Sink re-derives the actual operation and enforces a scoped authorization at the boundary where the effect would become real.

That hold-before-effect shape is what my gates do. The Modbus gate blocks the bad write before it reaches the backend. The shell gate denies before execution. JARVIS pauses state-changing steps for approval. And his five-questions table — identity, tool-invocation, staging, effect-commit, outcome evidence — maps onto those gates almost one for one.

Where the draft goes further than my current gates, honestly:

1. Re-derivation. The Finality Sink re-derives the actual operation from the raw act instead of trusting the proposer's description. My gates check the parsed fields as stated. If a request lies about what it will do, my gate checks the lie.

2. Authority at effect time. The validator checks current authority, including revocation, at the moment of effect. My gates check mostly static rules — the token gate doesn't check revocation at all.

3. Scoped, non-bearer authorization. Bound to one act, one destination, one validity window. My HTTP gate's key is a demo shared secret, and the token gate's tokens are static strings.

4. Outcome evidence from the destination. Receipts from the destination of record, not self-reported logs. My logs are written by the gate itself.

That's not a refutation — it's convergence, and it's a useful one. An independent draft landing on the same architecture tells me the direction is right. The four gaps above are now my upgrade list, in the draft's own terms.

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178 organizations got hit yesterday, and none of them were breached.

On Nov 16, attackers got into Optimizely's Web Experimentation platform through a flaw in its account signup flow, and injected JavaScript into customer projects. That code was then served from Optimizely's own CDN, under a valid certificate, to every site running the snippet.

BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC, IKEA, GitLab, Equifax. 188 infected snippets across 178 organizations, in 30 countries. Nobody broke into any of those sites. They didn't have to — the sites had already invited the script in, and trusted it with their pages' privileges.

What it did once it was running: swapped crypto wallet addresses on copy-paste, skimmed card numbers, expiry dates, and CVVs off payment forms, grabbed cookies and screenshots, and tried to push iOS exploit kits. About $7,000 in crypto went to attacker wallets before the code was pulled. Optimizely confirmed it, blocked the path, and had most of the malicious code gone within about 17 hours.

This is what a trust boundary failing at the vendor looks like. The boundary wasn't the victim's firewall or their login page. It was the snippet — a piece of code a site trusted completely, with no check on what it actually did once it loaded.

The fix for this class of failure is unglamorous: Content Security Policy, subresource integrity on third-party scripts, and monitoring for changes to the scripts you load. Verify what runs on your pages, don't just trust where it came from.

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Singapore just named the three tests an AI agent has to pass before anyone should trust it.

Jasmin Lau, Singapore's Senior Minister of State for Digital Development and Information, told Parliament on Nov 4: an agent earns trust through identity, authority, and accountability. Which agent is this, and who is responsible for it. What is it permitted to do, and on whose behalf. And can its actions be traced, so someone answers for them when it goes wrong.

Her line: "Agents can act for us, but they cannot answer for us."

Those are the same three checks the gates I build enforce — technically, on the wire, before the action happens:

Authority. The Modbus gate blocks the firmware write to [52,53] and forwards the legit write to [52,52]. The token gate blocks Bob withdrawing from Alice's account. The shell gate denies rm -rf /. The agent asks; the gate decides what it's allowed to do.

Accountability. Every decision lands in a record — allowed, denied, why. The STIX records now carry valid IDs and a declared extension, so a reviewer can actually trace a decision back to the rule that made it.

Identity. The honest gap. My HTTP gate checks a signature, but the key is a demo key — that's a placeholder, not an identity system. Singapore's answer here is a registry; mine is still being built.

The point isn't that my gates solve Singapore's problem. It's that the problem is the same one, and it's now being stated in Parliament: trust isn't a feeling about an agent. It's three checks, enforced before the action, with someone accountable after it.

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View Schomer's profile on Cyberr