Posted in GRC
Heelr by Cyberr | ISO 27001, NIS2 & DORA Compliance
Craig M. — Chief Product Officer @ Cyberr®
Do all your Microsoft 365 users have MFA?
Most teams answer yes. The honest answer is usually "it depends which screen you check".
A few places the gap hides in Entra ID:
→ Per-user MFA status shows "Disabled" for users covered by Conditional Access. The legacy view and the real enforcement disagree, so people stop trusting either.
→ Conditional Access exclusions. The break-glass account is fine. The service account excluded "temporarily" in 2023, and the group of contractors added to it since, are not.
→ Policies scoped to "All cloud apps" with report-only mode never switched to On.
→ Legacy auth paths that never prompt for a second factor, still allowed on older tenants for one integration someone forgot about.
→ OAuth consent grants. A third-party app with Mail.Read on every mailbox doesn't need anyone's password or MFA prompt.
→ Token replay. MFA was satisfied once; a stolen session token keeps working until it expires or is revoked.
None of this shows up in a once-a-year audit, because the configuration was correct on audit day. It drifts afterwards: a new app, a new exception, an admin role granted for a migration and never removed.
That's the problem we built Heelr Compliance to solve inside Heelr by Cyberr: continuous, automated checks against your own tenant's controls, so drift is caught the day it happens, not the day it's exploited.
And it's the honest answer to the skills-gap debate. ISC2's latest workforce study found 95% of organisations have at least one skills gap. Checking CA exclusions by hand every week is not where your scarce security engineers should spend their time. Automate what can be checked. Hire for what can't.
What's the most surprising exception you've found in a Conditional Access policy?
https://heelr.com/compliance

3 reactions · 1 comments
Comments
Schomer: Excellent breakdown of IAM drift, Craig. The fundamental issue with reliance on Conditional Access or ambient token states is that they treat "trust" as a persistent state wrapper rather than a strict, execution-bound constraint. When a session token is replayed or an old service account exclusion stays alive, the identity plane says "Allowed," but the context is completely lost by the time the ra