Posted in GRC
"Approved" is not the same as "enforced". Under NIS2, that gap now has a name attached to it. Article 20…
Craig M. — Chief Product Officer @ Cyberr®
"Approved" is not the same as "enforced". Under NIS2, that gap now has a name attached to it.
Article 20 requires management bodies to approve and oversee cybersecurity risk measures, and lets national law hold them liable for infringements. Article 21 puts access control and MFA explicitly on the list. Here in Luxembourg, the law of 5 May 2026 brings this to an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 entities, and directors must be trained themselves.
Security Affairs made the practical point well this week: boards don't need to pick admins, but they do need evidence that access is actually controlled.
The trap I see most often: the policy says "MFA for all users", the board signs it, and then reality drifts.
→ Service and break-glass accounts excluded from Conditional Access and never revisited
→ "Temporary" MFA exemptions for an executive or a legacy app that quietly became permanent
→ Legacy authentication still allowed on some mailboxes
→ Supplier and guest accounts that outlived the contract
None of these show up in a policy review. They show up when you test the control itself, continuously, and keep the output as evidence.
The useful board metric is not "policy exists". It is how many accounts the policy does not cover today, and how fast that number goes to zero.
That's why Heelr by Cyberr includes Heelr Compliance: continuous automated checks on your own controls, such as whether every Microsoft 365 user actually has MFA enforced.
How are you evidencing access control to your management body today?
#NIS2 #IdentitySecurity #Luxembourg
6 reactions · 2 comments
Topics: #luxembourg, #identitysecurity, #nis2
Comments
Schomer: The structural flaw in legacy compliance frameworks is treating audits as seasonal snapshots instead of continuous states. Policy sign-offs create an illusion of security, while configuration drift quietly dismantles the operational rules behind the scenes. If validation relies on manual verification checklists or spot checks, exceptions like legacy authentication or unmonitored supplier credentia
Victor Font: Craig, this is precisely the distinction boards must understand: approving a cybersecurity policy is an act of governance, but demonstrating that its controls operate effectively is an obligation of oversight. NIS2 reinforces that distinction by connecting management accountability to the implementation and supervision of cybersecurity risk measures. I would extend your proposed metric beyond the