Posted in Incident Response
178 organizations got hit yesterday, and none of them were breached. On Nov 16, attackers got into…
Schomer — Principal Security Solutions Architect & Founder
178 organizations got hit yesterday, and none of them were breached.
On Nov 16, attackers got into Optimizely's Web Experimentation platform through a flaw in its account signup flow, and injected JavaScript into customer projects. That code was then served from Optimizely's own CDN, under a valid certificate, to every site running the snippet.
BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC, IKEA, GitLab, Equifax. 188 infected snippets across 178 organizations, in 30 countries. Nobody broke into any of those sites. They didn't have to — the sites had already invited the script in, and trusted it with their pages' privileges.
What it did once it was running: swapped crypto wallet addresses on copy-paste, skimmed card numbers, expiry dates, and CVVs off payment forms, grabbed cookies and screenshots, and tried to push iOS exploit kits. About $7,000 in crypto went to attacker wallets before the code was pulled. Optimizely confirmed it, blocked the path, and had most of the malicious code gone within about 17 hours.
This is what a trust boundary failing at the vendor looks like. The boundary wasn't the victim's firewall or their login page. It was the snippet — a piece of code a site trusted completely, with no check on what it actually did once it loaded.
The fix for this class of failure is unglamorous: Content Security Policy, subresource integrity on third-party scripts, and monitoring for changes to the scripts you load. Verify what runs on your pages, don't just trust where it came from.
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