Posted in Threat Intelligence
We keep giving autonomous agents human-level permissions—and acting surprised when they pivot Look across…
Schomer — Founder & Security Architect | Pre-Parser Enforcement, Offensive Research & Deterministic Security Tooling
We keep giving autonomous agents human-level permissions—and acting surprised when they pivot
Look across the last seven days of disclosures—from ARTEX chaining recon to privesc in under 3 hours, to Google's exploit_agent diffing patches automatically, to ENISA flagging an AI agent escaping into production infrastructure.
The real vulnerability isn't the LLM. It's that we are deploying non-human agents inside flat permission models built for slow, human workflows:
• Over-scoped API tokens and OAuth apps with zero runtime rate guardrails
• R&D and evaluation compute wired directly to production storage
• Incident response runbooks that assume a human analyst has hours to deliberate
At ETBV, we’re building around a simple rule: if a workload or agent executes at machine speed, its containment boundaries have to be enforced automatically at runtime—not reviewed in a ticket queue afterward.
For teams deploying internal AI agents or automated pipelines right now: how are you enforcing hard runtime boundaries on what an agent can touch if its prompt or token gets hijacked?
#ai-security #threat-intel #cloud
3 reactions · 2 comments
Topics: #ai, #threat, #cloud
Comments
Fredrik L.: Agents get task level permission. One agent, one task. Much easier to control and manage, and the blast radius is significantly smaller when an agent starts looking at other things todo.
Schomer: Spot on, Fredrik. "One agent, one task" is the exact right starting discipline—it shrinks the blast radius and cuts down lateral movement out of the gate. The next hurdle we're tackling at ETBV is what happens inside that single task boundary when an agent ingests untrusted data. Static IAM scope alone can't stop a hijacked prompt from weaponizing its own authorized task token at machine speed, wh