Posted in Incident Response
Your ScreenConnect console had MFA. The extension didn't ask for it. On 11 November, Huntress saw rogue…
Craig M. — Chief Product Officer @ Cyberr®
Your ScreenConnect console had MFA. The extension didn't ask for it.
On 11 November, Huntress saw rogue ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit called SCKit pushed to at least 288 endpoints across 48 organisations in about 90 minutes. A second wave hit 205 hosts on 13 November.
The likely door, per Huntress (ConnectWise says initial access is still unconfirmed): RMM+, a third-party extension that lets another tool drive ScreenConnect sessions using a shared access key. That path sidesteps ScreenConnect accounts, roles and MFA. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, if nobody had ever set the key, a blank one was accepted. Most installs were legitimate. Added for a project, then forgotten.
The nastier part: SCKit is built to compromise the technician who connects to an infected machine to investigate, then reuse their session and permissions. Huntress hasn't seen that spread succeed. The intent is still clear.
What I'd check this week if you run ScreenConnect or any RMM:
→ Inventory every extension on every instance, on-prem included. ConnectWise disabled the suspect ones on hosted instances; on-prem is on you.
→ Treat every shared key or API path as an identity: owner, where it's set, last rotation.
→ Confirm technician clients run 26.6.5 or later, and audit Run Command and Toolbox history.
→ Investigate suspect hosts out of band (EDR, WinRM), never through the RMM session itself.
Continuous control checks matter here. In Heelr by Cyberr, Heelr Compliance automatically checks things like whether every Microsoft 365 user has MFA enforced. But any check only covers the doors you know exist.
When did you last list every way into your RMM that isn't a named user with MFA?
#MSP #RemoteAccess #IdentitySecurity
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Topics: #identitysecurity, #msp, #remoteaccess