Posted in GRC
I asked a client for their last pen test report and was shocked at how thin it was. I knew the firm that did…
Daniel O. — Senior Cybersecurity Consulting Engineer | EDR/XDR · Zero Trust · Architecture & Engineering | CISSP · CCSP · GIAC
I asked a client for their last pen test report and was shocked at how thin it was. I knew the firm that did the work. They had smart, experienced people. It wasn't a puppy mill pushing juniors through engagements. So what happened?
A few days later I got the rest of the story, including the scope and rules of engagement. The tester had been put in a straitjacket and locked in a room. They couldn't pivot between machines. They couldn't use any credentials they captured. Every exploit needed explicit approval, one at a time. Significant parts of the estate were off limits. On paper it was a pen test. In practice it was closer to a vulnerability scan with a glorified cover page.
The client dictated those restrictions. They told me so. That was their right, and the security firm still sold the result as a pen test. I never met the tester, but my read is they got handed a signed contract and told to deliver on it, and they did what they could inside the box.
Nobody came out of it well. The firm put its name on a report that looks weak to anyone who knows what a pen test report is supposed to look like. Read cold, without the scope in hand, it makes the tester look like they'd done less than the minimum. The client got a mostly clean report and could tell their own customers they had no High or Critical findings. The report did list constraints, in a boilerplate paragraph. Nothing in it told a reader how much of the environment had never been looked at. And everyone signed off.
A coverage statement on page one would have made the gaps visible. The client might not have wanted it, and the firm might have lost the work.
Every decision you make carries your name, or your company's. That's true in consulting, and it's just as true in a corporate seat.
Here's the in-house version. The CIO reads the draft report and says, "That Critical seems too high. An attacker would have a hard time even reaching it. Let's move it down so it doesn't freak out the board." You already accounted for that difficulty when you rated the finding Critical. If someone can show you missed something, revisit it. "It will upset the board" isn't evidence.
If you accept that feedback without pushing back, you aren't doing anyone a favor. The board is now making risk decisions on a picture you know is wrong, and you drew it. I promise, no one will remember the conversation during the breach.
I'm not telling you to refuse to be reasonable. I've had to bend more than once in my career. Usually it takes conversation and negotiation to find a version everyone can accept and be at least a little unhappy with. Having said that, I can negotiate scope, wording, and how we explain a finding. I can't sign off on a conclusion I know the evidence doesn't support. That's where compromise becomes unethical.
Your name is on the document. Make sure it holds up in a room full of people who know better. You won't be in that room to explain it.
#Cybersecurity #Integrity #ProfessionalEthics #Accountability #SecurityConsulting

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Topics: #accountability, #professionalethics, #securityconsulting, #cybersecurity, #integrity